Oxford energy expert Jan Rosenow explains why Europe is underestimating electrification, overestimating hydrogen and still arguing about scarcity when alternatives are abundant.
Europe’s energy transition is being shaped by a complex mix of national priorities, EU-level regulation, and legacy infrastructure. While the direction of travel toward decarbonization is broadly agreed, the pace and pathways vary significantly across member states. Fossil fuels remain embedded in parts of the system, even as renewables scale rapidly and electrification accelerates. Nuclear energy and hydrogen continue to divide opinion, with questions around cost, timing, and future relevance unresolved. At the same time, the rise of distributed energy production and storage is changing how power grids operate. So-called virtual power plants, which aggregate and coordinate these decentralized assets, are beginning to unlock new flexibility but face regulatory and cultural barriers. Although the scientific consensus on climate change is strong in Europe, sustainability is not always consistently integrated into energy policy and market decisions.
We spoke to Jan Rosenow to gain clarity on this clouded outlook. Rosenow is Professor of Energy and Climate Policy at the University of Oxford and is widely regarded as one of the world’s leading voices on the energy transition. He has presented at hundreds of organizations, including the World Economic Forum and the United Nations, and his research informs high-level energy policy across Europe. He advised the Energy Ministers of all 27 EU Member States at the Council of the European Union and has served as expert witness to both the UK and European Parliaments.
The host for this interview is Wolfgang Blau, Global Managing Partner of Brunswick’s Sustainable Business Practice and co-founder of the Oxford Climate Journalism Network at Oxford, which has trained journalists from more than 700 news organizations in more than 100 countries. He is also an advisor to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
In energy conversations, why do we use the word “scarcity” while so much wind and solar energy go unused?
From a scientific point of view, energy abundance is real. There is more than enough renewable energy available to power homes, transport and industry many times over. The problem is not that the resource is missing. The problem is that we are not harvesting enough of it yet and are still lacking the transmission and storage capacity. Currently, around 80% of the world’s primary energy still comes from fossil fuels, and fossil fuels are scarce by definition. So, both things are true at once: abundance in what is available to us, and scarcity in the way our economies are still fueled. We are in an awkward phase now, somewhat stuck in the middle of an energy transition. We’re still living with the after-effects of the energy crisis of 2022, while the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz has taught the world just how vulnerable a fossil-based energy system really is.
China is becoming the first electrostate. The US is doubling down on gas and oil. Between petrostates and electrostates, is there a third way for Europe?
Europe sits in a very interesting position. On the one hand, it remains highly dependent on imported energy. Last year, around 58% of the energy used in Europe was imported, mostly in the form of gas, oil and coal. On the other hand, Europe has built real industrial strength in several clean technologies, even if we do not talk about that enough.
We no longer lead in solar modules, and battery manufacturing has shifted heavily towards China. But in other sectors Europe is genuinely strong. Industrial heat pumps are one example. Electrothermal storage is another. In both, Europe has serious companies and technical depth. That means Europe does not have to think of itself only as an importer of clean energy technologies. It could also become an exporter and leader in some of these fields.
Whether that happens depends on political choices. I worry when I hear calls to weaken or postpone the phase-out of the internal combustion engine. In my view that will only weaken Europe’s industrial base over time. If Europe does not build competitive EVs, European consumers will buy Chinese ones.
“Some countries are already living this future. Others are still debating whether they want it at all.”
Are we focusing too much on combating climate disinformation and too little on rampant energy disinformation?
Yes, I think the debate has shifted. In the past, climate denial and climate skepticism were the main strategies. But over the last 10 to 15 years that has become much less effective because the scientific evidence is now overwhelming. Most people accept that climate change is real, human-caused and serious. So, the battle has moved to the solutions. If you cannot convince people that climate change is not a problem, you attack the technologies and policies meant to address it. One way is to claim that renewables are too expensive, too unreliable or unwanted. We see that constantly, and there is evidence that some of this is deliberately amplified. The second strategy is to overemphasize future technologies in ways that distract from what can be done now. You know the themes: the claim that nuclear fusion would solve everything, that carbon capture will save us later, that direct air capture will clean up the mess. Some of these technologies will indeed play a role but using them as excuses to delay deployment of what already works is a form of obstruction.
The fact that the sun doesn’t shine on us at night and that the wind doesn’t always blow is still in use as an argument against renewable energy. Isn’t this so-called “intermittency argument” outdated?
Largely, yes. First, all forms of power generation have variability. This is not unique to renewables. Nuclear output can be constrained by heatwaves because reactors need cooling water. Gas plants can fail under extreme weather conditions, as we saw in Texas. So the idea that fossil or nuclear generation is simply always there while renewables are uniquely unreliable is misleading.
Of course, wind and solar are weather-dependent. But storage has advanced rapidly, forecasting has improved dramatically and grids are getting better at managing variable supply. The underappreciated piece is flexibility. When renewable generation is high and electricity is cheap, you shift demand into those hours. When output is lower and gas plants are setting the price, you avoid those periods.
That is not some radical new idea. Industry has been doing demand-side management for decades. What is new is that it now matters far more across the wider economy. Yet flexibility is often misrepresented as rationing or state control. In reality, it is much closer to ordinary market logic. Peak train tickets cost more than off-peak ones. Fruit and vegetables are cheaper when they are in season. Energy should work more like that too. Better price signals create opportunities for households and companies to save money.
Where do virtual power plants fit into that?
They are part of the answer, but they face two barriers. The first is consumer participation. People need to be comfortable allowing someone else to optimize the charging of their EV, the operation of a battery in their house or the optimal running time of a heat pump. The second barrier is regulation. In some electricity markets, aggregators can participate and sell flexibility. In others, the rules still make that difficult or impossible unless you are also an energy supplier. So, this is not mainly a technology problem. It is often a market-design problem.
Who is ahead in Europe?
The Nordics are ahead, and Estonia is especially striking. Many people there are on time-varying tariffs, with prices changing every half hour or so. They have apps that show them prices and consumption in real time and allow them to optimize accordingly. It is normal. Compare that with Germany, where smart meter rollout is still painfully slow and the debate is stuck on fears about privacy. Some countries are already living this future. Others are still debating whether they want it at all.
“We are in an awkward phase now, somewhat stuck in the middle of an energy transition.”
Why have Europe’s right-wing populists fallen in love again with fossil fuels?
Partly because climate and clean energy policy usually involve an active role for the state: regulation, carbon pricing, infrastructure planning, market design. For those with a strongly libertarian worldview, that is deeply uncomfortable. Opposition to climate policy becomes part of a wider opposition to state intervention. And then there is the political economy. Fossil fuel industries are highly effective at lobbying and shaping public debate. In some countries, especially the US, that influence is more visible.
The old energy trilemma was to strike a balance between energy affordability, security and sustainability. Currently, that masks as a dilemma only, with sustainability or climate barely being mentioned as a reason for the transition. Why?
Because the political debate shifted sharply after the war in Ukraine, and now again with the war in the Middle East. First, the focus was much more on climate and decarbonization. Then affordability and energy security moved to the center. That is understandable, but it has made the debate much more short-term. We have lost some of the longer-term vision of what kind of energy system we actually want and need.
I also think some people overpromised on the cost savings. Renewables are often much cheaper on a generation basis. But much of what households and firms still pay for is fossil energy, and gas continues to set electricity prices in many markets. Before reaping the cost benefits of renewables, we need heavy upfront investment in grids, storage and electrification. In the long run, the new system will be cheaper. But there are transition costs, and pretending otherwise has not helped.
It is also too narrow to argue for the transition only based on future power prices. The benefits are much broader: cleaner air, less noise, better industrial performance, stronger resilience and less dependence on authoritarian suppliers of fossil fuels, let alone the cost of future climate impacts if we don’t transition.
Do you see the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz as a temporary energy crisis, or as a turning point, a catalytic moment for the world’s transition to renewables?
That is the question I keep coming back to. It depends on what governments do in the next 12 to 24 months. Every major energy crisis has produced two things simultaneously: a short-term scramble to secure more of whatever you were already using, and a longer-term acceleration of alternatives. After 2022, we got the fastest solar and heat pump deployment Europe had ever seen.
The Strait of Hormuz blockage is different in one important respect: The alternatives are now cheaper. In most of the world, new wind or solar is cheaper than new gas. The economic case for the transition has never been stronger.
Crises create political space. If governments use that space to double down on fossil fuel infrastructure, this will be remembered as another missed opportunity. If they use it to accelerate grids, storage and electrification, this could be the moment the transition became irreversible.
What gives me some optimism is that the argument has shifted. We are no longer debating whether renewables work. We are debating how fast to deploy them. That is a different and better argument to be having.
Can you talk about Europe’s risk of replacing its fossil dependency with a dependency on mostly Chinese energy technologies?
There is a big difference between these two dependencies. The current system needs a constant stream of imported fuel in order to function. In a more electrified system based on renewables, the imported equipment matters at the point of installation and replacement, but not every day thereafter. Once the solar panel or wind turbine is in place, the fuel is the wind or the sun and these machines last for decades. That does not mean strategic dependencies disappear. Europe still needs much more resilience in manufacturing, recycling and supply chains. But it is fundamentally different from being dependent on the continuous import of single-use fossil fuels. Over time, a more circular clean energy system is far more secure.
“What gives me some optimism is that the argument has shifted. We are no longer debating whether renewables work. We are debating how fast to deploy them.”
Has the AI-driven data center boom derailed or accelerated the energy transition?
It could cut both ways. In the US, there is a real risk that rapid data center growth leads to a new build-out of gas generation because companies want power fast. That is clearly a problem. But there are also positive possibilities. Data centers can be located where renewable electricity is abundant. Their waste heat can be used in district heating. AI may also help optimize energy systems more efficiently. So it is not all bad or all good. It depends on where the growth happens and what powers it. If it is mainly gas-fired, that is a concern.
What about Europe’s recurring dream of a nuclear renaissance?
I am skeptical. I am not ideologically anti-nuclear, but the recent record in Finland, France and the UK is one of large cost overruns and long delays. New nuclear simply takes too long and costs too much to be the main answer over the next decade, which is exactly the period in which Europe needs to decarbonize electricity quickly. Nuclear will continue to play some role. But I do not see it becoming the dominant solution. The cost trajectory is moving in the wrong direction compared with renewables, and the actual pipeline of projects is nowhere near what would be needed for a genuine renaissance.
You have also been critical of the EU’s hydrogen strategy. Why?
Expectations became detached from reality. The hydrogen targets presented under REPowerEU [the European Commission’s energy strategy, adopted in 2022 in response to the disruption caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine] were unrealistic from the start, in my view. Much of the political enthusiasm came directly from the hydrogen lobby, including actors closely linked to the gas industry. Hydrogen does have uses where direct electrification is difficult or impossible: fertilizer production, some industrial processes, perhaps shipping, aviation and some forms of long-duration storage. But that is very different from a broad hydrogen economy. Over time, many sectors that were once expected to need hydrogen have shifted towards batteries or direct electrification instead. Cars are the clearest example. Trucks increasingly as well. Hydrogen will be part of the future energy system, but probably a niche part.
While discussing energy technologies and policies, are we as climate and energy communicators gravely underestimating our cultural attachment to fire—that deeply rooted idea that there can’t be energy without first burning something?
Yes, combustion is deeply embedded in our history and imagination. People intuitively understand a flame. They do not instinctively understand a heat pump or an electric industrial process in the same way. But cultures change, and energy cultures have changed before. Most people in Europe no longer cook or heat their homes the way earlier generations did. Even a gas boiler is already abstracted. You do not really see a flame anymore. You just experience the service. At some point soon, the default intuition will flip, and people may ask the opposite question: Why would you burn something when that is so inefficient? That shift has already begun.
Meet the authors
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Global Managing Partner, Sustainable Business
London
Wolfgang is the Global Managing Partner of Brunswick's Sustainable Business Practice, collaborating with teams in 27 cities worldwide.
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